In 2012, the Government of Colombia enacted Law 1508, providing new regulations for Public-Private Partnerships, and initiated a new generation of road concessions. Under this framework, control instruments are based on operational performance indicators, and revenues for the private party become available only when the infrastructure becomes fully functional and it complies with service metrics. Risks associated with operation phases are now significant in contrast with conventional risk analyses that prioritize the construction phase. Although the construction period is shorter than the operation period of PPP projects, very little analysis is available for operational risks. This study proposes a qualitative research and case study methodology, with the comparison of road concession cases in Spain and Chile with Colombia, and the analysis of contractual documents and performance reports as a source of operational performance requirements, risk allocation and activation events. Nonconventional factors are identified such as third party influence and user behavior, opposite motivations in demand management between toll income and maintenance requirements, negative incentives in availability payments, split incentives in the public-private relationship, and ambiguous definition in force majeure events and insurance coverage. Recommendations are proposed for further risk assessment and allocation.
INTRODUCTION
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have been recently regulated in Colombia under an availability payment structure, supported by the fulfillment of service level indicators and revenue penalization when operation failures are detected. The aim of this model is to incentivize an accelerated completion of the construction phase under quality standards governed by compliance with service metrics. The financial structure is based on asset subdivisions called "functional units". Each functional unit supports bonds with partial credit guarantees from the Colombian Government; moreover, payments to the private party and bond issuance are only possible when each unit becomes fully operational (Fitch Ratings, 2012) . Following these regulations, the National Infrastructure Agency (Agencia Nacional de Infraestructura -ANI) initiated a new 4 th Generation (Cuarta Generación in Spanish) road concessions program in 2013 with an estimated cost of USD 24.3 billion (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2013) .
Previous experience in Colombia in road concessions goes back to the mid 90's. Private participation in infrastructure provision evolved across third generations with an incremental allocation of risk to the private party. Although previous contractual models included operations and maintenance (O&M) monitoring indicators, controls proved to be flexible and the penalty clauses established burdensome rules for demonstration of non-observance. In addition, payment structures were associated with construction milestones, which further emphasized the construction phase. As a consequence, information in previous concessions about failures during operational phases is scarce.
Risk assessments are a significant part of a PPP structuring process, for either side, Private or Public. For the public, risk creates contingent liabilities that require expenditure only if an unforeseen event occurs. These liabilities are a fundamental instrument for public guarantees of private debt and are the basis of PPP schemes (Irwin T. , 2003) . The goal of optimal risk allocation is to minimize the overall cost of a project, not necessarily the costs to each party separately (Molenaar, Anderson, & Schexnayder, 2010) . Nevertheless, risks associated to operation phases tend to be less studied than construction-related risks (Doloi, 2012) .
Common risk identification tends to define operational risk as the deviation of O&M costs, and it is usually allocated to the private party (World Bank -PPIAF, 2009 ). Within these risks, commercial risk defined as the inadequacy of revenue or traffic risk, is usually considered to appertain to the operations phase. The World Bank -PPIAF (2009) describes allocation scenarios for traffic risk and compensation mechanisms such as minimum income guarantees, time compensations, and risk sharing based on profits or internal rates of returns. Some authors also include risks associated with higher O&M costs or more frequent maintenance and a variety of operation events such as low productivity, delays or shortfall in service quality. Some others risks are not exclusively related to the operations phase but their significance may increase with time, usually in connection with regulatory, political and financial risks. Another risk group involves fitting for purpose, technical obsolesce and residual transfer value (Hwang, Zhao, & Jiang Shu Gay, 2012) (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002) . Regarding design and construction influence on O&M, Doloi (2012) proposes a correlation of upfront construction decisions with the operational performance. This research revealed that market dynamics are the most critical attribute influencing both construction cost and operational performance in PPP projects.
Literature review showed that little investigation is available concerning operational risks in PPP road projects. Typical analyses tend to fully allocate operational risks to the private party. However, convenient risk management entails a detailed assessment for proper allocation, including sharing and capping instruments that may retain part of the operational risk in the public side.
METHODOLOGY
This research is based on the hypothesis that the framework conditions for PPPs in Colombia increase risk factors of the operational phase in road concessions. The main objective is to perform an extensive identification of risk factors linked to the operations phase that can be activated in Colombia.
For the research, contractual documents are used as a source of operational performance requirements and indicators, as well as risk allocation. Following the recent definition of this type of contract in Colombia, there is no actual experience in implementation. To offset this lack of information, comparisons are made with international cases, since they share similar requirements, either by availability payments such as the Spanish case or similar O&M conditions as is the Chilean case. These case studies exemplify contractual frameworks that have been used as reference for Colombia's new concession legislation.
The contractual review is complemented with factual information about performance of road concessions on which to base risk identification. This performance data consists of payment discounts and claims from Spanish concessions, and force majeure events during operation phases in Colombian concessions, both obtained in January 2013 from the public administration.
The base case is the 4 th Generation Program, started by the Colombian Government in 2012. As the base case, the payment and revenue structures will establish the benchmark points for the other case studies. Payments are made on a monthly basis throughout the operations phase, and are proportional to the compliance level of a weighted indicator of quality of service, safety and infrastructure availability. Revenue originates from availability payments funded by the Government and tolls.
Ruta del Sol is the second case. This project precedes the 4 th Generation in Colombia with similar concession deeds; it incorporates indicator-based availability payments but differs in payments due upon completion of construction milestones. The operational indicators were defined including physical measurements of the road and service qualifications such as road safety standards, availability and information. This concession was awarded in 2009 and is currently under construction. The fourth case, Autopistas de la Región de Antofagasta, was awarded by the Chilean Government after a Private Finance Initiative in 2010 under the former legal framework, and is closely related to the 4 th Generation and Ruta del Sol in terms of service levels and toll collection conditions. The payment mechanism differs from direct deduction to a detailed penalty scheme applied on O&M conditions. With regard to performance information, a status report of operational road concessions was obtained from the public administration in charge of the AAPG Program in Spain. This report summarizes the payment deduction status of ten road concessions with availability payments and shadow tolls. As a significant benchmark, most of the indicators of the AAPG program were adopted by the Colombian administration to be applied in Ruta del Sol and 4 th Generation programs. The Colombian concession performance, as explained before, has no information about O&M, but the public administration keeps records of force majeure, uninsured and social political events occurring during the operations phase. This information was acquired from thirteen ongoing projects.
RESULTS

Contractual clause review and comparison
Each contractual requirement in the cases studied carries inherent risks related to the possibility of failure to meet the established standards. Risk activation arises as do cost and time overruns, or else give way to substandard service and penalization. As a consequence and as a common best practice in risk management, in all four cases each contractual agreement has major risk identification and allocation. The greater part of identified risk occurs in the design and construction phase; for instance, operational risk is mostly allocated to the private party. Some exceptions include commercial risk and instruments to deal with force majeure, insurance coverage and Government decisions.
The most influential attribute in operational risk is the long term, because a significant part the decisions must be made upfront during the bidding process and design stage. As a common aspect, a number of long-term variables are allocated to the private party. For example, in the four cases analyzed, commercial risk is partially transferred in the form of an income offer; sometimes as a total minimum toll income offer a toll collection period, or an offer of a revenue flow of public funds. In 4 th Generation and Antofagasta, the owner grants a commercial income backing with periodic payments that cover the difference between forecasted and actual toll income. This sharing mechanism leaves only the liquidity risk to the concessionaire whereas the public side assumes traffic and toll-related issues. The portion of risks retained by the owner might benefit a rationed bid price and it eases debt placement while reducing income risk perception. In the Colombian cases, another condition in the offer is the fraction of public funds that may be paid in US Dollars instead of Colombian Pesos to share exchange rate risk. There is also a common possibility to have another source of income from the exploitation of roadside facilities and services. Although few, these additional sources allow some degree of diversification benefits on income other than toll revenue.
The availability payment model induces a variable-income structure that depends on compliance of service levels and performance indicators. This feature acts as a resultsoriented mechanism that compels the concessionaire to respond for the O&M risks. From the bidding process, the offer must contain an O&M plan, explicitly in the Spanish and Chilean cases, or at least as an adherent form in the Colombian cases, both holding the concessionaire responsible for the design and forecasting decisions. After the income penalization scheme comparison, it is common to emphasize that most of the performance-related payments take only the negative form of discounts, excluding road safety performance in the Spanish case that allows a slight income gain when results are positive. Therefore, this penalization structure may possibly encourage higher bid prices after the mixed effect of the perceived likelihood of income discounts and the small possibility of restoring income deductions.
In all four cases there are unequivocal definitions of force majeure events. However, ill-defined allocations may exist while differentiating insurable events from non-insurable, the latter assumed by the public party in the form of force majeure. While the Spanish and Chilean concession deeds rely on force majeure jurisprudence, the Colombian cases give specific treatment in the events of disproportionate time for environmental permitting and land acquisitions.
In the Colombian cases, there are two major types of insurance enforceable by the public contracts regulation, one in the form of a performance bond and a limited 5-year warranty after the completion of major construction and maintenance tasks. This warranty sets challenging O&M design conditions given that the last 5-years warranty period of maintenance works outlives the contract end date. The other type is a liability insurance that covers potential damages to third parties throughout the operation period. After public policies on climate change, property insurance is demanded for natural disasters, fire, explosion and some terrorist actions, strikes and riots. This coverage also includes a form of builder's risk insurance that comprises maintenance works. Coverage must be calculated under a Probable Maximum Loss figure, not excluding that the concessionaire must pay for damages not protected by either the insurance or assumed by the Government as exonerating events. In this scenario, design decisions as well as operation plans must carefully contain control and prevention measures for the obligations and deductibles imposed by the insurance policy contract. In the case of 4 th Generation, insurance deductibles include landslides, erosion and other damages caused by the lack of maintenance or failure to identify stabilization measures.
Public party decisions (Acts of State) are to some extent described in all cases, most of them assuming toll plaza repositioning, tariff changes and road closure caused by Government decisions. The Spanish case explicitly excludes the creation of new infrastructure as a cause of claims from the private party. Alternatively, the Colombian cases cover this competition with the partial sharing of commercial risk. On the other hand, changes in technological standards provide different allocation in the analyzed cases. The Spanish case assigns this risk to the private party, even though it is limited when the new standards require important alterations of the built infrastructure. In 4 th Generation, the owner decides which new standard becomes enforceable and may recognize additional costs for implementation.
Performance indicators
Most of the O&M activities are comprised in the performance indicators, as well as their effect on payment deductions. In the Colombian and Spanish cases, each indicator has a proportional value depending on the extent of road under compliance level and is weighted to add the monthly deduction on income. In the Chilean case, however, each failure has an independent penalization. Table 1 summarizes the indicators in each case, the appraising method and relative influence on payment deduction or penalization.
Recurrent risks are identified by type of indicator or underlying obligations. Thus, it is possible to differentiate groups of indicators and their associated risks as follows:
Surface and physical condition indicators: These are intended to rate the condition of pavements, and physical components of the infrastructure, usually attempting to reflect the condition of wear, physical capacity and service. Risk is related to predicting errors in design decisions in construction and maintenance cycles, construction influence on maintenance, variations in O&M prices, climate change or increased traffic. There is also a possible negative incentive effect caused by either excessive or defective penalties.
Infrastructure management and serviceability indicators: These indicators focus on service delivery and availability. Risk arises from O&M planning and interaction with users and third parties to fulfill availability indicators. The third party group includes other Government entities that may impact road traffic as well as neighboring inhabitants. As a consequence of external interference, rising costs of public liabilities become relevant.
Road safety indicators: Safety indicators are established to encourage improvement in accident and fatality rates and emergency response. These indicators involve variables that are not controlled by the concessionaire but include objectives intended to guide public management of accident rates. Risk is increased by greater transaction costs of exculpatory events, split incentives between insurance coverage and premium costs, as well as dependence on user behavior and third parties to achieve road safety rates. In all four cases, some indicators outweigh the others in payment deductions. Five groups are easily identified as the most penalized, such as surface conditions (roughness, rutting, friction, and structural strength), emergency response and accident rates, congestion or lane occupancy, and the information system for performance surveillance. Nevertheless in the 4 th Generation structure a simple availability indicator represents the largest part of penalizations. This might be considered a tool to palliate deductions, given the minimal probability of failure to comply with this indicator, which acts as a safeguard for income level with positive outcomes on risk perception.
Also in the 4 th Generation case, the fixed term for the concession is a particular feature that implies aggravation of design and maintenance forecasting risk, in particular if traffic growth exceeds initial estimates and more maintenance works are demanded to fulfill O&M indicators.
Performance information
As actual information of contractual performance, Table 2 shows the AAPG status of payment deductions related to O&M claims. Seven out of ten concessions fail to comply with at least one performance indicator during the operations phase. Those indicators include delays in the installation of traffic counters, failures in winter operations, road availability, safety barriers and emergency response. From a total of ten penalization proceedings, three have been solved with payment deductions, whereas the remaining six cases are pending or have restarted the procedure.
The imposition of penalties shows difficulties in meeting all indicators and contractual conditions. Consequently, payment deductions are triggered with negative impact in profits and to some extent in financial risk perception. The prevalence of pending and reissued claims is an evidence of risk arising from owner-concessionaire interaction, suggesting ambiguity in performance indicator definitions or contradictory results that increases the transaction costs of claims and dispute resolution. This is also an indication of inefficiency in the indicatorbased mechanism that may be improved, on one hand, by refining the definition of indicators or their measurement method, and on the other, by facilitating discount imposition and dispute resolution.
None of the claims reported involve indicators that measure the surface conditions of the road, suggesting that the private side properly manages maintenance risks. In the Colombian scenario, Table 3Table 3 shows 24 cases of force majeure, socialpolitical issues and uninsured events that occurred in 13 road concession projects during the operations phase. There is an evident difference in risk allocation, even for the same cause, as it is shown for extreme weather conditions and social rejection of toll plazas. In both examples some cost overruns have been assumed by the Government, others by the concessionaire and others remain unresolved. From the public side, although it is not clearly stated in all cases, decisions regarding risk allocation are influenced by insurability of each event. Furthermore, one case shows insufficient insurance coverage in security issues, supporting the evidence that risk arises from breaches in the definition of force majeure events, insured coverage or negative incentives due to the perception of higher premium costs and morale hazard. 
Risk identification
From the previous descriptions and comparisons, an extensive list of risks was identified. Table 4 shows seven risk categories and it suggests an allocation distribution or sharing where appropriate to reduce the overall cost of risk in a project. This list might also help for further research in risk management for PPP projects. Decrease in asset value.  Negative incentives to achieve performance indicators due to higher marginal compliance costs than penalization costs  Ambiguity in performance indicator definitions and/or outdated measurement standards  Measurement errors or contradictory results that affect payment reduction and penalization  Increased transaction costs in claims and dispute resolution Note: Shaded cells indicate risks shared by both parties CONCLUSIONS O&M risks, commercial risks, financial risks and regulatory risks are often identified in other studies, but some components become significant in the specific case of 4 th Generation and the availability payments structure. With regard to the road operation portion of O&M risks, the aggregate effect of increasing cost of emergency response, uninsured calamities, third party and user influence on indicator results, shows a particular risk arising from the indicator-based model and the interaction with road safety policies. These risks are not fully controllable by the private party itself and may lead to general cost escalation in project risk and the bidding price. In this point, the owner -concessionaire relationship must be also considered, because the indicators may possibly configure negative incentives. The counter effect could be viewed in the form of a risk pricing analysis to reduce the overall cost of risk. In this scenario, indicators for road safety can take the form of positive additions to payments, instead of sole deductions. For the public side, the social benefits of accident reductions tend to be high and may compensate additional payments to the private party. For the concessionaire, an income recovery option will impact in decreased risk perception and fewer contingent provisions.
The AAPG performance results suggest that maintenance risk is properly allocated in the availability payments model. However, in contrast with commercial risk, the effect of demand growth is divergent. In the 4 th Generation and Autovía de la Plata cases, the strong participation of public funds constrain the term of the concession contract and tend to untie toll income flows from maintenance expenditures that are logically correlated for user volume. In this case, accelerated traffic growth will decompensate the toll-maintenance balance and may cause maintenance cost overruns. A proper traffic-related compensation might alleviate this difference.
The performance analysis found risks in the relationship between the owner and the concessionaire, revealing flaws in the indicator mechanisms and the resolution of disputes. The analysis also reports that force majeure events are not easily distinguishable between insurable and uninsurable events. This suggests failures in assurance management with split incentives in premium costs, risk coverage and influence of morale hazard. In these aspects, contractual provisions established from the beginning might facilitate adjustment scenarios and conciliation. Otherwise, transaction costs arise to prevent efficient management for both parties.
Questions concerning risks are generated by the concept of negative incentives in availability payments, especially by the generalized use of indicators for income deductions of the concessionaire. The basis of this mechanism is to cause reductions that affect the private profit whenever service quality does not reach its highest level. Therefore, bonuses or positive incentives are scarce or nonexistent. It may be inferred that the private forecasts of potential reductions in revenue will be reflected in higher bid prices if they are not allowed to recover the difference. It is also possible that some indicators with little influence in payment deductions may not be accomplished when costs of fulfillment surpass penalizations.
For further research, the listed risks might aid an extensive operational risk assessment in PPP projects, specifically if oriented towards availability payments. In relation to road concessions, when performance data is available, a balance of overall risk costs may help optimize the indicator effect on availability payments and risk allocation.
